The aim of this article is to challenge methodological nationalism in the study of workers' insurgencies by proposing a way to chart the influence of US history far beyond its borders and across time. Historiography on the IWW includes both national and transnational studies. Scholars have taken up the issue in the context of an international labour movement, connecting stories between places as distant as the US, South Africa and New Zealand, and they have also emphasised the First World War as a global event that had a powerful impact on the history of the IWW, in the context of which the US government began to suppress it. 2 Marcel van der Linden has suggested 1 'Si tratta probabilmente del problema più noto in Italia di tutta la storia del movimento operaio americano', that a way to trasnationalize American labour history would be to look at how its organisations have served as models for other countries. 3 I would like to further broaden the framework of transnational labour history by looking at the influence of the IWW in another social and political context, focusing on the use of the past by political activists far removed in time and space from that episode of American history. The importance of this analysis lies in the way it illuminates the particular context in which these activists operated. It tells us more about Italian history than it does about American history, but it is testimony to the 'far reaching' influence of American history and to entanglements that crossed borders through the work of activists, scholars, and translators. 4 Thus, this project is an attempt to internationalise both American and Italian history through what I would call a diachronic transnational approach.
At the same time, together with this diachronic influence there are also synchronic links. For instance, the enthusiasm of Italian activists and left-wing historians regarding the IWW matched the American New Left's renewed interest in the late 1960s after they had fallen out of favour for decades. The work of Melvin Dubofsky and James Weinstein, as well as coverage on Radical America, the magazine of the SDS, and an earlier study by Philip Foner were the main sources upon which the Italians drew for their interpretation of the IWW. 5 Thus, in itself the strange career of the IWW in Italy is evidence of the larger phenomenon of transnational streams of intellectual and political exchange in the late sixties and seventies between US and Italy, an issue to which I will return later. It was ironic that a generation of political militants who contested America's racist and unequal society and its foreign policy would choose its history as a source of inspiration and intellectual work as well as embrace its cultural icons and symbols. 6 Umberto has described this as the 'Americanism of an anti-American generation'. 7 In fact, for Italian radicals the study of the IWW went beyond a mere historiographical interest; it was a compelling topic because it provided a lens through which to examine, and intervene in debates about, internal developments of class struggle and the restructuring of capitalism during a period of extensive economic and political transformation in Italy.
Italy in Turmoil
The juxtaposition between radicals' interest in the IWW and the working class upheaval in Italian nations and actually with terms comparatively more favourable to workers. 8 In some respects, it could be said that the effect of the Statuto dei lavoratori was comparable to the Wagner Act (1935) in the US in that it represented a major victory for the labour movement but it was eventually instrumental in stifling strident militancy on the shop floor. Ironically, in the US that model of industrial relations would enter a period of crisis precisely in the 1970s, undermined as it were by an economic recession, industrial restructuring, and relocation, as well as dwindling support from the rank and file.
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In 1971 and 1972, radical groups such as Lotta Continua and Potere Operaio, which had facilitated the alliance between the student movement of 1968 and the autonomous workers' movement of 1969, still had many followers in the factories, in particular the large ones, but they were no longer able to command the bargaining agenda as they had earlier. Trade unions, now protected under the terms of the Statuto, had a structure that enabled workers to voice their claims through an institutional channel (which had not been readily available in most of the 1950s and 1960s). In the process of reaching out to radicalised workers, unions had themselves become more democratic.
The delegati, or shop stewards, were so effective in representing workers that even Lotta Continua, which was opposed to any form of permanent institutionalised representation ('We are all delegates!'), agreed that its members could be candidates. Shop floor bargaining became the norm in the automobile factories of Turin to such an extent that foremen even micro-bargained the speed of the line with the shop delegate at the start of every shift. This amounted to management negotiating production targets with unions, an astounding accomplishment.
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In 1973, after a period of two years in which radicals had been very vocal but enjoyed diminishing support, workers were again on the barricades at Mirafiori, FIAT's flagship plant in Turin, where they had achieved their greatest success. From November 1972 to March 1973, FIAT autoworkers fought for the most progressive contract up to that point, the last significant gain before an era of company restructuring and relocations outside Turin and Italy which would permanently alter the balance of power. The occupation of Mirafiori, which was orchestrated by radicals, was an event of national import for its political and symbolic consequences, and it was also the peak of the autonomous and radical workers' movement; from that point on, it would begin to slip into demise. The economic recession set off by the oil crisis bolstered the firm's policy of relocation and state-assisted redundancies (cassa integrazione), which appeared to be the best solution to respond to the shop floor upheaval of the previous years. In the early 1970s, the cassa integrazione became a tool that large manufacturers such as Indesit (Turin and Caserta), Lanerossi (Schio and Foggia), Philco (Bergamo), Borletti and Pirelli (Milan), and many other large manufacturers used to eradicate industrial conflict in factories, while at the same time they indirectly funded company In turn, the workerists' analysis of the 1960s had focused on the emergence of what they called the 'mass worker' as the central subject of Italian capitalism, who, in terms of 'class composition', was young, unskilled, often an immigrant southerner and working on the assembly line. This was a political subject who had emerged in the US during the time of the New Deal-a period which was read by the workerists as an instance of capitalism responding with a 'plan' to counteract workers'
insurgency. 15 The 'mass worker', typically a male, was working in the regime of the Fordist factory and paid a family wage which guaranteed his reproduction, and he occupied a strategic position in the Fordist production process, which meant that he was made the linchpin of the whole revolutionary strategy of the operaisti. In fact, the latter sought to wrest the mass worker from a capitalist plan that presented itself in the benign manifestation of 1) national unions engaged in bargaining for incremental benefits at the expense of workers' control at the point of production, and 2) the reformist left parties, including the PCI, which emphasised electoral participation and parliamentary action instead of grassroots activity.
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Wobblies: Italian style
It is with these premises that the operaisti turned their attention to the IWW in 1973, a year that signalled the coming transformation of that Fordist-Keynesian model on which they had based their analyses and interventions in the labour struggle. 19 It is easy to understand why the Wobblies were so fascinating for Italian radicals when they were re-discovered in the 1970s. Here was a grassroots organization that sought to deflect the labour movement from its protection of the existing prerogatives of a dwindling number of craft workers (the 'aristocracy of labour') and to mobilise the mass of unskilled, immigrant workers (just the type that were prominent during the autunno caldo) with direct action, imaginative tactics and radical demands. The IWW's choice of direct action, such as the total halt of production, mass demonstrations, and sabotage, had also characterised Italian workers' unrest in the period since the autunno caldo and it resonated with
Italians. 20 Even more interestingly, the IWW's refusal to compromise with the position of the Socialists, which led to Haywood and his followers leaving (or being expelled from) the ranks of the The proposition, then, is to lay stress in our agitation upon the essential point: that is, upon the places of production, where the working class must unite in sufficient numbers before it will have the power to make itself felt anywhere else'. 22 This position bore striking resemblance with the one expressed by Mario Tronti in one of the founding texts of operaismo, 'La Fabbrica e la Società', in which he had written about the misconception in the Communist Party of thinking that 'the party can lead the revolution from outside the factory gates'. 23 That the politics on the point of production was central to revolutionary politics was a basic assumption for Bruno Cartosio (who would go on to become a leading American historian in Italy) when he noticed that the IWW was mainly focused on '...the class struggle which was, every day, the reality. It was in their intervention on the different aspects of the struggle that the creativity of the IWW's organizers and militants was at its best'.
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Equally appealing was what was reported as the IWW's lack of interest in being recognised by employers or in enforcing contracts bargained with management; rather, they sought to expand their support base among workers and to leave the right to strike unbridled.
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The reasons why the IWW was so appealing for the Italians were perhaps best summed up by Sergio Bologna in one of the first books to revisit American labour history from a workerist perspective.
Bologna asked, 'What was there in the IWW that is so extraordinarily modern?' and he questioned why it was relevant for the Italian context. Firstly, it was an organisation that (according to Bologna in his selective interpretation) addressed the immigrant proletariat and therefore spoke to the working class with its 'intrinsic characteristics'. Secondly, it addressed a mobile workforce, not one that is necessarily employed, building up coordination between different struggles and leveraging on the spirit of the insubordination of the proletariat. And third, it relied on an equally mobile organiser Glaberman was also in regular correspondence with Bruno Cartosio, who spent two years in North America. Therefore, the rediscovery of the IWW as a 'workerist' organization had taken place within a network of political activism that bridged two continents and had been fostered by reciprocal interest in the contemporaneous waves of worker mobilizations at the end of the 1960s.
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The disappearing mass-worker
As the 1970s progressed, the Italian reading of the IWW evolved in response to the challenges to Romiti, announced that the company had run out of cash to pay workers' wages and laid off 73,000
workers with state-assisted redundancy funds (cassa integrazione). 34 With average inflation standing at over 17 per cent, organised labour focused its demands on getting an automatic yearly salary increase that was to be equal for all employees (punto unico di contingenza). 35 The crisis highlighted widespread movement of the 'self-reduction' of social housing rent, utility bills and bus tickets, which had spiralled following inflation; that struggle was initiated by radicals in the late 1960s but escalated in those years and was eventually supported by unions as well. 36 Operaisti argued that inflation was part of capital's plan to roll back the wage gains that workers had secured in previous years. 37 Self-reduction was organised so that a reduced amount would be paid to bus companies and energy providers; the latter initially refused to go along with it but reversed their decision once the movement gained momentum. The protest started in Pinerolo, an immigrant working-class area in the outskirts of Turin, not far from FIAT Rivalta, a newer plant that had been constructed in 1967 to assist production at Mirafiori, and it spread to other working class neighbourhoods and eventually to other parts of the industrial north as well as Rome. conceptualised 'class composition' as the nexus between the technical characteristics of the working class in the production process, political subjectivity, and array of 'antagonistic behaviours' that the same working class adopted to oppose that technical division of labour. 40 An understanding of this evolving class composition was thus crucial to any prospect of successful labour militancy, as it provided the basis for comprehending distinct segments of the workforce and their combative relationship with the production process. As production was moved from massive plants such as
Mirafiori and decentralised at small factories and, later, at plants with more sophisticated automation and robotization, the composition of the Italian working class also changed. what they called the 'centralità della fabbrica', operaisti were now struggling to find a strategic framework that could be adopted in a world where the Fordist factory was likely to fade from view. In their publications, these radicals were self-critical. One particular set of criticism and self-criticism is important in the context of this study: the idea that Lotta Continua (and others, such as Avanguardia Operaia) had changed from being groups responsive to the self-activity of workers and their class needs into organisations driven by a vanguard of leaders who then tried to 'sell' a political line to the rank and file. 45 One militant asked, 'How are we to fight the legacy of this [Leninist] tradition which has affected us deeply and paralysed us?'. 46 One possible way out seemed to be the IWW.
The Italian Left in Crisis
The gap between the leadership and workers was exemplified by the defeat of Lotta Continua's demand for a 35-hour workweek at FIAT Mirafiori. In 1975, Lotta Continua had intervened in national metalworking contract negotiations by trying to override the union's modest proposal of reductions of working hours. The proposal had gained some interest among FIAT workers but was rejected by the national assembly of metalworkers. It also created internal tensions-a fistfight among workers erupted on the occasion of a demonstration in support of the union's contract 44 One workerist describes the 1977 upheaval in this way: 'The 1977 movement was something completely different. It was a new and interesting movement because, firstly, it did not really have roots in previous movements, or maybe it did, but in a highly complex manner. It clearly had another social basis, different from both 1968 and 1973. It had a social composition based on youth who had broken with or rejected the political elites, including the elites of 1968, including therefore the groups of Lotta Continua, or even of Autonomia Organizzata. So, it broke not only with the traditional communist movement, but also with 1968. It broke exactly with the vision of communism, while, at the end of the day, also the workerists thought of themselves as being the "true communists". The '77 Movement absolutely did not want to be "truly communist"'. platform in Turin. 47 Eventually, the proposal did not win the support of a majority of metalworkers, not even at FIAT, where Lotta Continua had its strongest following. That defeat prompted critiques of the group leadership, exemplified by the comment of one worker who complained, 'Our organisation emerged from workers' autonomy, but we the workers have now lost importance in its decisions.
[…] We need to claim back our role without our positions being determined from above, as in the case of the 35 hour [workweek]'. 48 As noble as it was, it seemed to be an idea parachuted to workers, not arising from the rank and file.
This type of direction from above found an echo in the seven 'theses' that emerged from the only a means, not an end. 'The party must develop working class autonomy and not substitute itself for it', wrote the CAO, but nonetheless with 'the view that the "full expression" of working class consciousness could only be brought "from without"'.
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While the 'Leninist turn' of many protagonists of the 'autonomia' is now part of the mainstream interpretation of the Italian radical left of the seventies, the debates about political strategy were always fluid in that decade. For instance, in one of the final documents produced during its existence
Potere Operaio had reiterated their support for 'organised autonomy and workers' leadership'
(autonomia organizzata e direzione operaia), that is, the necessity of workers' hegemony in terms of political action on the basis of a fusione completa of external activists within the working class.
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Another workerist collective, Gruppo Gramsci, had similarly affirmed that the organisation of workers' autonomy (an apparent oxymoron) would have to occur inside the movement, not as 'an external political idea of a group that "leads" the movement'.
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In the context of this ongoing debate, the IWW also represented a model of a non-Leninist rank-andfile organisation, a prime example of how to be attuned to the needs and demands of the working to public opinion an image of an ungovernable system which needed to be transformed in order to revamp productivity. 60 FIAT drew on taxpayers' money to manage the layoffs and, over the course of the 35-day protest, dealt a decisive blow to the opposition of the trade union leadership. Unions eventually bowed to the altered balanced of power and were unable to challenge the implementation of the company's plan, buying into the argument that FIAT's need to restructure was an inevitable response to the lower productivity of workers and the crisis of the automotive sector. The long strike, which exhausted and divided the workers, ended after a much-publicised counter-march by plant supervisors and conservative citizens who argued for a return to normalcy on behalf of the 'silent majority'. 61 The final agreement was more unfavourable in terms of laying off workers than the one initially put forward 35 days earlier and it ushered in a period of time in which Italians took stock of the decline of blue collar culture associated with the 'economic miracle' of the 1950s. The difficulties that the trade unions experienced in restructuring were compounded by the fact that between 1975 and 1980 a segment of radical activists had brought to the extreme their endorsement of a vanguard revolutionary philosophy by embracing clandestine armed struggle on behalf of, but dissociated from, the majority of workers that they claimed to represent. 62 The dozens of attacks, including kidnappings and murders, carried out against FIAT executives and management created the impression that there was a connection between any endorsement of radical activity on the shop floor and actual terrorist actions, leading unions to be ambivalent in their support of militant tactics. 63 Often presented as a foregone conclusion due to the decline of productivity, the political effects of terrorism, and the international shift away from Fordism, the sconfitta operaia (workers' defeat) of 1980 was also due to the contingent choices made within the left that had once led shop floor politics. With the absence of critical, militant, and organised groups on the left, the Mirafiori workers who opposed FIAT's restructuring plan found themselves silenced and divided; trade unions were left as the only bargaining partner for FIAT management but their ability to bargain had been undermined, rather than enhanced, by the declining influence of radical politics. 64 Eventually trade unions made choices that reflected national political considerations (the 1980 final agreement was signed in Rome at a tripartite bargaining table) rather than concern for shifting power relations on the point of production. In the following decade, FIAT workers, reduced in number and drastically different in terms of their class composition, abandoned both radical politics and trade union membership, while the company's success during those '35 days' led the way for a national backlash against organised labour in the private sector and its marginalization in national politics. 65 In this different political environment, some of those 'militant historians' who in the 1970s had been drawn to the IWW in a search for a 'usable past' entered academia as professional researchers, creating a core group of Italian Americanists who used the channels of academic publishing to promote their vision of American labour history as a 'distant mirror' of the woes of the Italian
